The IAEA reports that the DPRK is not in compliance with its safeguards agreements and that verification of nuclear material used solely for peaceful purposes cannot be confirmed[10] An overview of enhanced safeguards under the Additional Protocols and Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements is that Ms. Rockwood discussed several key issues related to the invocation of paragraph 14 for the non-application of safeguards. The Additional Protocol is a legal document granting the IAEA additional inspection powers over and above the authority provided for in the underlying safeguards agreements. One of the main objectives is to enable the IAEA inspectorate to provide assurances on declared and possible undeclared activities. Under the Protocol, the IAEA is granted extensive access rights to information and websites. In response to these questions, the VCDNP hosted an event on September 15. October 2021, a webinar with Laura Rockwood (Director, Open Nuclear Network) and John Carlson (Non-Resident Principal Investigator, VCDNP) to discuss the impact of a naval nuclear propulsion program on the application of nuclear safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA identifies four main processes for the implementation of protective measures. It should be noted that the amended SQP became binding on the United States when the Department of State informed the IAEA of the United States` adoption of the amended SQP on January 30, 2017, but only came into effect when the United States met the domestic legal requirements to implement the amended SQP in the Caribbean territories of the United States.
On July 3, 2018, the Department of Foreign Affairs informed the IAEA that legal conditions were in place for the entry into force of the amended SQP agreement in the United States. NRC collected the first inventory information from licensees and the United States reporting to the IAEA under the amended QSP began in August 2018. • Operations A: Conduct security inspections in East Asia and Australasia • Operation b: Conduct security inspections in the Middle East (South-West Asia), South Asia, Africa and the Americas; This geographical region also includes non-EU European states • Operations C: Conduct security inspections in the states of the European Union, Russia and Central Asia • Verification operations in Iran (as defined in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal) Safeguards are based on assessments of the accuracy and completeness of declared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities of a State. Verification measures include on-site inspections, visits, and ongoing monitoring and evaluation. In principle, two packages of measures are implemented in accordance with the nature of the safeguard agreements in force with a State. The term “state-level concept” was first used in an IAEA document in 2005, although the IAEA has continued this practice since the early 1990s. The state-level concept will be used for all states with a comprehensive safeguards agreement, a valid additional protocol and a broader end result. In a 2013 report, the IAEA Director General indicated his intention to continue to develop State-level approaches to the implementation of safeguards for other States. The five nuclear-weapon States of the NPT have concluded safeguards agreements that cover all or part of their peaceful nuclear activities. Under these voluntary tendering agreements, entities are notified to the IAEA by the State concerned and offered to apply safeguard measures. The IAEA applies safeguards under voluntary tendering agreements to nuclear material at certain facilities. The IAEA developed State-level approaches for five additional States in 2018, bringing the total number of countries with comprehensive safeguards agreements and an approach developed at the State level to 130.
According to the IAEA in 2018, “these 130 states hold 97% of all nuclear material (after significant quantities) under agency safeguards in states with comprehensive safeguards agreements.” What is the Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements? The Small Quantities Protocol is a protocol that can be concluded in conjunction with a comprehensive safeguards agreement. It has been available since 1971 and its text was standardized in 1974 (original protocol for small quantities). On September 15, 2021, the governments of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States announced the creation of a “strengthened trilateral security partnership” between the three countries, called AUKUS. The partnership includes, among other things, the supply of a fleet of conventional nuclear-powered submarines for Australia. Following the announcement, international experts raised questions about nuclear naval propulsion in the context of the global non-proliferation regime, and in particular about IAEA safeguards under comprehensive safeguards agreements under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Under article III of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), all non-nuclear-weapon States are required to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, known as the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA or INFCIRC/153 corrected). Given the near-universal adherence to the NPT, protective measures are now widely used. Approval by the Council.
Should the agreements referred to in paragraph 14 be approved by the IAEA Board of Governors? Wife. Rockwood noted that paragraph 14 was prima facie ambiguous because it did not contain any language that explicitly required the approval of the Board, but rather referred to the iaea-State agreement. In their view, if the Board of Directors were referred to the Board of Directors by the Chief Executive Officer, it could decide that his consent is required. Rockwood said there are pros and cons to each approach, which she addresses in a 2017 paper published by the Federation of American Scientists on nuclear naval propulsion and IAEA safeguards. The Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (GFSA) is required for non-nuclear-weapon States under the NPT and an option for non-NPT States. When concluding a CSA with the IAEA, States must indicate in an initial report the type and quantity of material subject to safeguards. The IAEA verifies that a State`s declaration on nuclear material is correct and complete. A CSA also gives the IAEA the power to independently verify that all nuclear material in the territory or jurisdiction of a State is not diverted for nuclear weapons or explosives and that nuclear facilities are not misused.
The IAEA provides a number of useful services to Member States, including assistance in maintaining the necessary documentation and assistance in protective measures. [9] These agreements allow states to exercise their right under the NPT to peaceful nuclear energy without fear of developing nuclear weapons in violation of the Treaty. Over the past decade, IAEA safeguards have been strengthened in key areas. These measures are aimed at increasing the likelihood of detecting a secret nuclear weapons programme and at building confidence in States` compliance with international obligations. The IAEA and Canada concluded the first safeguards agreement in 1959, and in 1961 the IAEA Board of Governors approved a document setting out the principles of safeguard measures. Since 1961, the scope and application of protective measures have evolved. The vast majority of safeguards are comprehensive iaea safeguards with non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT and nuclear-weapon-free zones. To date, the IAEA has concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with 175 countries.
Some 100 of these States have also concluded small-scale protocols for their comprehensive safeguards agreements. Design Information Verification (VID) is the process of confirming the design characteristics of a facility and verifying that the design features are accurate and valid. This activity is carried out within the framework of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, through which all signatories comply with the provision and regulation of safeguards. In his remarks, Mr. Carlson presented further perspectives on the perceived and actual risks of an NNWS with access to nuclear naval propulsion. His conclusion was that the “gap in paragraph 14” is not as great as some might think. He reiterated Ms. Rockwood`s argument that the non-application of protective measures should be as limited as possible and stated that all processes other than the actual use of the nuclear material concerned in the submarine, including enrichment, fuel production, storage, transport, reprocessing and disposal, should be subject to comprehensive safeguards. If the IAEA draws a broader conclusion for a State, it can implement “integrated safeguards” tailored to each State. As a result, the resulting application of security measures will become less burdensome and cost-effective for that State. Amended Code 3.1 requires countries to submit to the IAEA information on the design of new nuclear facilities as soon as the decision on the construction or approval of the construction of the plant has been taken […].